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I. Introduction
Privatization of the criminal justice system' has taken a danger-
ous new form that threatens important equality interests entrusted to
the impartiality of the government prosecutor. Government prosecu-
tors have begun accepting, and in some cases soliciting, voluntary con-
tributions from the private sector in order to pay the costs of certain
types of criminal prosecutions. Such private financing of criminal
prosecutions has taken place within the last few years in California,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.' The source of the money
is typically that segment of the business community most affected by
the crimes to be prosecuted.
Private financing of a government prosecution in a criminal case
frames a unique set of questions about what role equality should play
in a prosecutor's decisions.3 Should a prosecutor be able to consider
1. Privatization in the United States usually means "enlisting private energies to im-
prove the performance of tasks that would remain in some sense public." JOHN D. DONA-
HUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 6-7 (1989). While private financing of government
criminal prosecutions is relatively new, the privatization of other parts of the criminal jus-
tice system has been a subject of great interest for some time. For analysis of privatization
of law enforcement, correctional institutions, and the judiciary, see PRIVATI Z NG mE
UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992). For a discussion of
constitutional aspects of the privatization of corrections, see Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of
the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REv. 911 (1988). For a theo-
retical analysis of privatization in general, see Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Laws,
and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449 (1988).
2. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
3. Private financing differs from the use of private prosecutors in criminal cases, a
practice that has a long history in the United States and that still exists in a number of
jurisdictions. Private prosecution involves a private party filing a criminal complaint
against another private party and hiring private counsel to prosecute that complaint. Pri-
vate financing, on the other hand, involves a private party financing all or part of a criminal
action brought by the government against another private person. Private financing, un-
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the willingness of a victim to finance a prosecution in choosing which
cases to prosecute or to what extent a case should be prosecuted?
Would such victims enjoy preferential access to justice? By expanding
the resources available to a government prosecutor on a selective ba-
sis, private financing introduces a new tension into prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking: Society's interest in punishing the guilty must compete
with society's interest in equal treatment by government.
In allocating their limited time and resources, prosecutors choose
which crimes to prosecute based on the type of crime, the nature of
the victim, and the nature of the potential defendants. Prosecutors
are expected to be guided in these choices by the "public interest,"4
but embedded in the prosecutor's conception of the public interest are
trade-offs among competing public goods and competing private inter-
ests. Is it more in the public interest to prosecute insurance fraud or
environmental crime? To prosecute fraud committed against busi-
nesses or against consumers? To invest heavily in a single death pen-
alty prosecution or to spread the same investment of time and money
over all crimes of violence? Currently, such choices are entrusted to
the sole discretion of the prosecutor. Private financing raises the
question of whether taking voluntary contributions from victims or
other private groups creates a conflict of interest-a conflict between
the prosecutor's obligation to be impartial in making these choices
and the prosecutor's institutional interest in the monies received.
Private financing of criminal prosecutions also raises the question
of whether institutions, as opposed to people, can be biased by money.
Prosecutorial conflict of interest typically involves a prosecutor who
has some personal interest-sometimes pecuniary-in the prosecution
of a given criminal case. A paradigm example is the prosecutor who
prosecutes a defendant in a criminal case and simultaneously repre-
sents the victim of the crime in a civil suit against the same defendant.5
Private financing arguably involves no such personal interest because
like private prosecution, raises questions about the capture by private interests of the gov-
ernment's considerable law enforcement powers. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying
text. For a constitutional analysis of private prosecution that includes a complete bibliog-
raphy of authorities and commentary, see John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REv. 511 (1994).
4. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,395 n.5 (1987) ("[T]he constituency
of an elected prosecutor is the public, and such a prosecutor is likely to be influenced
primarily by the general public interest."); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249
(1980) ("Prosecutors ... must serve the public interest."); see also Bessler, supra note 3, at
561 n.214 and authorities cited therein.
5. See examples cited infra note 57.
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the money does not flow directly into the pockets of any individual
prosecutor-instead, it flows into the coffers of the prosecutor's office.
Private financing has taken a number of different forms. In Cali-
fornia's Silicon Valley, a district attorney prosecuting a trade secret
case allowed the victim corporation to pay more than $13,000 for in-
dependent expert investigators and was recused by the trial judge,
who found that receipt of the funds created a conflict of interest.6 Lo-
cal businesses in California's Ventura County voluntarily contributed
$150,000 to a fund used by the district attorney to prosecute workers'
compensation fraud, a fund that has operated with the California At-
torney General's blessing.7 In Portland, Oregon, local businesses have
funded the salary and office expenses of a "neighborhood district at-
torney."8 In Philadelphia, the district attorney established a nonprofit
corporation for the purpose of accepting private contributions for a
variety of purposes, which include financing certain prosecutions.' In
an unusual case not involving contributions from business interests, a
number of people from all parts of the country sent donations to help
finance the costs of the prosecution against Susan Smith for the mur-
der of her two sons after the media reported that the rural South Car-
olina county might not be able to afford the expense of a death
penalty prosecution.' 0
The trend toward private financing is driven in part by chronic
fiscal pressures. Prosecutors at all levels of government face budget
6. In affirming the recusal, the California Supreme Court noted that the issue was
one of first impression and held that "such financial assistance to the prosecutor's office
may indeed disqualify the district attorney from acting further in a case, if the assistance is
of such character and magnitude 'as to render in unlikely that defendant will receive fair
treatment during all portions of the criminal proceeding."' People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d
310, 312 (Cal. 1996) (quoting People v. Conner, 666 P2d 5, 9 (Cal. 1983)). The court
upheld the recusal based on a California statute establishing grounds for disqualification of
a prosecutor. See id at 316-19.
7. See Jeff McDonald, Private Funds OKd for Use in Prosecutions, L.A. Tims, Apr.
28, 1993, at B1; see also Paul Elias, D.A. Inches Ahead in War on Insurance Fraud; Work-
ers' Comp: Privately Funded Unit that Investigates and Prosecutes Suspected Cheaters Has
Registered Mixed Results and Steady Criticism from Defense Attorneys, L.A. TMEs, Feb.
19, 1996, at B1.
8. Telephone Interview with Wayne Pearson, Deputy District Attorney, Multnomah
County, Or. (Aug. 5, 1995).
9. Telephone Interview with Al Toczydlowski, Deputy District Attorney, City of Phil-
adelphia, Pa. (Dec. 9, 1996).
10. See Al Dozier, Judge: Use of Private Funds OK, Tim HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.),
Jan. 26, 1995, at 4A. The case achieved national notoriety because Smith initially claimed
that an unidentified African-American male kidnapped her two sons, and she pleaded for
their safe return on national television. Smith subsequently confessed to drowning the
children herself. See Jim Clarke, Smith Held Without Bail in Death of Her Sons, L.A.
TimEs, Nov. 6, 1994, at A-22.
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cutbacks at the same time that public concern about crime is at an all-
time high." Taxes, the traditional means of financing government
prosecutions, are seen as politically unpopular.1 2 Allowing some sort
of private financial contribution arguably helps to close the gap be-
tween supply and demand for the prosecution of crime.
Private financing may also be seen as a way to make government
more efficient in prosecuting crime.13 Partnering public with private
dollars is an increasingly popular form of "reinventing government,"
through which public resources are directed toward the problems that
concern society most.1 4 In some cases, private financing could be seen
as a "user's fee" for those victims of crime who wish to use the crimi-
nal justice system.15
However, private financing is driven by more than just monetary
concerns. Private financing taps into powerful pressures for a greater
involvement of the victim in the criminal justice system. A view exists
that both society's interest in punishment and the individual interests
of the victim lose out to the interests of the criminal justice system's
repeat players-the judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel who
deal with one another on a daily basis.' 6 Some believe that only
through greater participation of the victim in the charging and disposi-
11. See, e.g., TmE REAL WAR ON CRImE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL Jus-
TIcE CoMnssioN 1 (Steven A. Donziger ed., 1996) (arguing that $100 billion yearly ex-
penditures on crime control demonstrate an obsession with crime); Andrew Blum,
Prosecutors Say Money Squeeze Pinches Justice; Crime Bill Bottleneck, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 30,
1995, at Al
12. "'All of our public-opinion polls indicate that when you confront citizens with
their preference for raising revenue-user fees, property tax, local sales tax, local income
tax-user fees win hands down."' DAVID OsBoRNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING Gov-
ERNMEN7r How Tm ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRT is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
203 (1992) (quoting John Shannon, former Executive Director of the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations in Washington, D.C.).
13. "In recent years, the 'public choice' movement has held that government agencies
will be more responsive and efficient if they can be compelled to react to marketlike
forces." DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: UNDERSTANDING MANAGE-
MENT, POLITICS, AND LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 9-10 (1993).
14. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 12, at 203-04.
15. "Both user charges and fees attempt to relieve burdens placed on the general-
revenue system by extracting greater contribution from service beneficiaries .... ." JOHN L.
MUKESELL, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS FOR mu PUBLIC SEC-
TOR 422 (1995).
16. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VIc rms' RIGHTS IN
CRimiNAL TRIALs (1995); LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THm UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCING (1994); Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 357, 390 (1986) ("Recognizing the crime
victim's privity of interest in exacting justice for the harm committed ought to be a priority
of the criminal justice system."). But see, e.g., Stephen Schulhofer, The Trouble with Tri-
als; the Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 828 (1995) (book review).
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tion of crimes will criminals get their just deserts and victims their
recompense due.17 From this latter perspective, private financing
could be seen as a means both of squeezing more punishment out of a
criminal justice system in which institutional players are too often will-
ing to compromise and of shaping the course of the prosecution in a
manner beneficial to the victim.
The thesis of this Article is that private financing serves economic
efficiency and the interests of victims selectively, at best, and inevita-
bly at the expense of equality interests whose importance has not been
appreciated fully. Private financing in any of its likely forms threatens
equality of treatment by potentially biasing the prosecutor in favor of
the contributors. Such a practice sacrifices the equality of the prose-
cutor's choices in order to enlist the financial support of victims who
have both a direct interest in the prosecution and the money to fur-
ther that interest. Ultimately, the overall benefit of that support to
society does not justify the damage done to the legitimacy of govern-
ment prosecutions.
Part II describes how the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion en-
trusts the prosecutor to make decisions implicating important equality
interests and argues that conflict-of-interest rules play a key role in
protecting those interests. A division of labor operates in how liberty
and equality interests are protected in the criminal justice process.
The threat to liberty interests posed by the overzealous prosecutor
whose commitment to obtaining a prosecution has overwhelmed her
commitment to the truth is regulated by judicial review of the prose-
cutor's actions on a case-by-case basis. The threat to equality interests
posed by the partisan prosecutor who favors private interests in her
decisionmaking process is regulated in an entirely different fashion.
Owing to the inherently discretionary nature of prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking, judicial review of a prosecutor's actions in any individual
case cannot detect such favoritism. Instead, a set of prophylactic rules
shields the government prosecutor from undue influence by any pri-
vate interest. These rules define as a conflict of interest any practice
that threatens to impair the prosecutor's disinterestedness.
17. See, e.g., Peter L. Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" to a Criminal Prosecution: A
Proposed Model Statute for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL
L. REv. 329 (1989); Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Ac-
tion: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PE,'P. L. REv. 117 (1984); Abraham S. Gold-
stein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515 (1982);
Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE LJ. 488 (1988). But see, e.g., Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in
Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CitM. L. REv. 233 (1991).
Spring 1997] PRIVATE FINANCING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 671
Part MI argues that private financing creates such a conflict of
interest. Three cases are analyzed in which the Supreme Court has
considered how revenue flows can threaten institutional impartiality,
and various forms of private financing are evaluated in terms of that
analysis.
Part IV evaluates the economic efficiency and victims' rights ar-
guments in favor of private financing and discusses the equality inter-
ests threatened in terms of legitimacy, preferential access to justice,
and the capture of public power by private interests.
II. The Meaning of an Impartial Prosecutor in an
Adversary System
What is the proper relationship between the prosecutor and the
victims of crime in our society? This question takes on special signifi-
cance when there is a direct flow of money from victims to govern-
ment prosecutors.
The paradox of the "impartial prosecutor" has haunted past ef-
forts to explore the relationship between prosecutors and crime vic-
tims. Prosecutors are often described as being in some sense
impartial.18 Yet, as a participant in an adversary system, the govern-
ment prosecutor is expected to be a zealous advocate. 19 Since the
judge in our system of justice occupies a neutral as opposed to accusa-
torial role, the prosecutor alone must advocate zealously the state's
interest in convicting and punishing the guilty. In such a context, "im-
partial prosecutor" seems to be a contradiction in terms.
The following subpart resolves this tension in the prosecutor's
role20 by arguing that equality interests and liberty interests are pro-
18. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that an impartial prosecutor generates the important
feeling that justice has been done); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The
United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all."); Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a crimi-
nal defendant is entitled "to an impartial prosecutor, who can make an unbiased use of all
options available"); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 315 (Cal. 1996) ("The nature of the
impartiality required of the public prosecutor follows from the prosecutor's role as a
respresentative of the People as a body, rather than as individuals."); MODEL RULES OF
PRoEssIoNAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
19. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that the public prosecutor should prosecute
"with earnestness and vigor").
20. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (holding the prosecutor to a higher standard of behavior than de-
fense counsel); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONslBmnIY EC 7-13 (1982) ("The
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tected in the criminal justice system in different ways. The remaining
subparts support that argument by describing the inherently discre-
tionary nature of prosecutorial decisionmaking and the limited judi-
cial review of those decisions, and by analyzing the Supreme Court's
leading case on prosecutorial conflicts of interest.
A. The Paradox Resolved: Different Protections for Different
Interests
Confusion about the prosecutor's role has its source in a failure to
distinguish between two different types of impartiality. First, govern-
ment prosecutors are expected to be impartial in the sense that they
are required to seek the truth and not merely to obtain convictions.2'
For example, a prosecutor who fails to disclose exculpatory material
to the defense violates the defendant's right to an impartial prosecutor
because it is less likely that the jury will arrive at the truth.z2 Such acts
of partiality by prosecutors are often described as "over-
zealousness. 23
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict."); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS,
§ 13.10.1, at 759 (1986) ("They are the only governmental officers responsible for obtaining
convictions of the guilty in litigated criminal cases; but they also bear alone the state's
considerable responsibility to see that no innocent person is prosecuted, convicted, or pun-
ished."); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 669, 698 (1992); Dirk G. Christensen, Comment, Incentives vs. Nonpartisanship:
The Prosecutorial Dilemma in an Adversary System, 1981 Duxrr LJ. 311 (1981); see also
W.J. Michael Cody, Special Ethical Duties for Attorneys Who Hold Public Positions, 23
MEM. ST. U. L. REv., 453, 456 (1993); Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 537-38 (1986).
21. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrrY EC 7-13 (1982) ("[H]is duty
is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); STANDARDS FOR CRIMwNAL JusIcE Standard 3-
1.1 cmt. (1979) ("[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the inno-
cent as well as convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the
rights of the public."); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is
not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall."), cited in Bessler, supra note 3,
at 545 n.135.
22. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (prosecutor must disclose to
defense evidence that would be sufficient to undermine confidence in outcome of proceed-
ing); Brady v:Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor cannot suppress material evidence
favorable to accused); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY EC 7-13 (1982)
("[A] prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he be-
lieves it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused."). For a discussion of the
prosecutor's due process obligations of disclosure, see Terrence Galligan, The Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence After United States v. Bagley, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETmIcs 213 (1987).
23. One commentator has proposed a system of personal financial incentives to dis-
courage overzealous prosecutors. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influenc-
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Prosecutors are not, however, expected to be impartial as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. While prosecutors are, in theory,
zealous advocates for the truth, they develop a conception of what the
truth is in particular cases and then become wedded to that concep-
tion. Embedded in the structure of the criminal justice system is a
recognition that the prosecutor's partiality to that conception of truth
can threaten the liberty interests of the accused. The process of judi-
cial review, which begins once the charge is filed in court, guards
against any "overzealousness" resulting from the prosecutor's belief in
the guilt of the accused. Indeed, the entire procedural process of
criminal cases can be seen as one continuing safeguard of the various
liberty interests vulnerable to the overzealous prosecutor.24
The second, distinct sense in which prosecutors are expected to
be impartial is that they are not supposed to discriminate for or
against any particular group in deciding which cases to prosecute.25
One aspect of this obligation is that prosecutors are not supposed to
favor improperly one complaining party over another. Instead, it is
expected that all victims will receive equal consideration vis-a-vis one
another 2 6 For example, a wealthy victim of an assault and a poor
victim of the same crime should enjoy an equal claim upon the prose-
cutor's time and energies. A corollary expectation is that a prosecutor
will not target a person for prosecution on invidious grounds.27 This
second type of impartiality has been described as
"disinterestedness."' 2
ing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv.
851 (1995).
24. See e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (prosecutor must cure
false testimony by disclosure); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (prosecutor cannot pres-
ent false evidence); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983) (prosecutor
has obligation of fairness in presenting a case to grand jury); MODEL RunES OF PROFMS-
SIONAL CONDucr Rule 3.8(b) (1995) (Prosecutor must "make reasonable efforts to assure
that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel
and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel."); id at Rule 3.8(c) (Prosecu-
tor must "not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial
rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing.").
25. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that discriminatorily selec-
tive enforcement bars prosecution regardless of guilt of accused).
26. Cf. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 400 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (prosecutors cannot put private interest before the public interest); Berger, 295 U.S.
at 88.
27. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
28. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,804 (1987); Wright
v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is a bit easier to say what a disin-
terested prosecutor is not than what he is. He is not disinterested if he has, or is under the
influence of others who have, an axe to grind against the defendant, as distinguished from
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The criminal justice system is not structured to protect against
partiality of the prosecutor to some private interest because the prose-
cutor's decisions about whom to prosecute and to what extent to pros-
ecute are not subject to meaningful judicial review.2 9 For this reason,
conflict-of-interest rules preclude direct ties between a criminal prose-
cutor and the private interests affected by her charging decisions.
Thus, while it is assumed that the prosecutor will become partial to
the version of reality she constructs during the charging process, con-
ffict-of-interest rules attempt to keep the prosecutor as free from in-
fluence as possible during her construction of that version of reality
and throughout the subsequent exercise of her discretion.
B. Equality and the Inherently Discretionary Nature of Prosecutorial
Decisionmaldng
While the liberty interest at stake in any particular prosecution
resides, for the most part, in a particular defendant, the equality inter-
est is more diffuse. For each criminal accusation filed by the govern-
ment, a number of chargeable cases were not filed because of limited
prosecutorial resources. The equality interest implicated in each crim-
inal case charged is shared among all of the crime victims whose cases
could potentially have been charged. Their interests in vindication in-
evitably compete against one another as the prosecutor allocates her
limited time and resources. Favoring one victim over another as a re-
sult of personal influence violates the other victims' equality
interests.30
the appropriate interest that members of society have in bringing a defendant to justice
with respect to the crime with which he is charged.").
29. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCHm FOR IDENTrrY 3
(1980) ("The American prosecutor enjoys an independence and discretionary privileges
unmatched in the world."); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 393, 394 (1992) (arguing that the vast accretion of prosecutorial power has trans-
formed the criminal justice system by skewing power in favor of the state); Robert G.
Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Ex-
pansive Litigation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 137, 137 (1995) (arguing that increased penalties
and mandatory sentences have given federal prosecutors "greater leverage to virtually
compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence determine the length of
sentences"); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1365 (1987) ("[C]ontemporary efforts to constrain the discretion
of actors in the criminal justice system have not only bypassed the prosecutor, they have
tended to expand her power by squeezing the system's seemingly insoluble bubble of dis-
cretion her way.") (footnotes omitted).
30. The defendant also shares in this equality interest to some degree. Defendants
have a right not to be selectively prosecuted on invidious grounds. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at
456. Private financing raises interesting questions about the extent of this equality interest.
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Any criminal case brought by the government is the product of a
multidimensional selection process. In a society with sweeping laws
and finite resources for enforcement, prosecutors decide which types
of crimes to prosecute and which to ignore.31 Some commentators
have criticized prevailing prosecutorial policies for emphasizing prop-
erty and drug crimes over so-called "white collar" crimes.32 Yet se-
lecting enforcement priorities is essential in a society where not all
crimes are truly considered equal in terms of their impact on the pub-
lic interest.
A different perspective on charging emphasizes that prosecutors
decide who gets prosecuted and who does not. At one level, this is a
function of the types of crimes that prosecutors target for enforce-
ment. A drug enforcement policy focusing on street sales of inexpen-
sive "crack" cocaine in economically depressed areas rather than
"suite sales" of cocaine in its more expensive powder form has had the
demonstrable effect of targeting poor people of color.33 Some see
these effects as incidental and others do not.34
However, the prosecutor's selection of who gets prosecuted may
lead to unequal results on another, more fundamental level. If the
police arrest two people for the same crime based on evidence of
equal strength, a prosecutor has complete discretion to prosecute one
and "discharge" the other.35 This more explicit type of selectivity is a
function of the many factors that prosecutors are generally expected
to consider in making the charging decision. The National District
Is equality offended if a defendant faces a more effective prosecution on account of the
wealth of her victim? See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
31. "The prosecutor commonly and normally screens potential violations and selects
those which he feels most warrant investigation and prosecution. Such discretional action
is induced by lack of investigative and prosecutorial resources, by legislative overgeneral-
ization, and by low enforcement priority of some violations." NATIONAL DIsTRIr ATroR-
NEYs Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTON STANDARDS 128 (1977) (commentary to Chapter 8)
[hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
32. See e.g., Michael L. Benson et al., Community Context and the Prosecution of Cor-
porate Crime, in WHITE-Cou CRmE RECONSIDERED 269 (Kip Schlegel & David Weis-
burd eds., 1992).
33. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1493
(1996), Justice Stevens noted that 88% of federal offenders convicted for trafficking in
crack were African-American even though the majority of crack users are white.
34. See Lisa Stansky, Crack vs. Cocaine, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1996, at 19-20.
35. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 31, at Standard 9.3 ("The prosecutor is not obligated to file all
possible charges which available evidence might support. The prosecutor may properly
exercise his discretion to present only those charges which he considers to be consistent
with the best interests of justice.").
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Attorneys Association lists the following factors as among this rele-
vant to the charging decision:
1. The nature of the offense;
2. The characteristics of the offender;
3. The age of the offense;
4. The interests of the victim;
5. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness;
6. A history of non-enforcement of a statute;
7. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice
authority;
9. Aid to other prosecuting goals through non-prosecution;
10. Possible deterrent value of prosecution;
11. Undue hardship caused to the accused;
12. Excessive cost of prosecution in relation to the seriousness
of the offense;
13. The probability of conviction;
14. Recommendations of the involved law enforcement
agency; and
15. Any mitigating circumstances. 36
The relationship between these factors is fluid: "In a given case, any
one or combination of these illustrative factors may be a basis for re-
jecting a case."37
A decision involving so many factors is inherently discretionary in
the sense that "it cannot be reduced to a predictable formula. ' 38 The
decision always seems to depend on the facts of the case in a way that
resists abstract standards. For example, strong evidence of a noctur-
nal trespass by a person with a long history of burglaries may seem
less charge-worthy if one envisions a seventy-five year old, terminally
ill defendant. Meanwhile, equally solid evidence of a nocturnal tres-
pass by a person with no prior criminal record and a long history of
community service may seem more charge-worthy if one learns that
the suspect is a campaign worker caught in the headquarters of a
political rival. Context is everything in charging decisions.
39
36. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 31, at Standard 9.3 (factor 8
omitted in original). Clearly the fact that prosecutors are forced to consider the cost of a
prosecution under the current regime is the single most compelling argument for consider-
ing the use of private financing. In an ideal world, the prosecutor would be free to select
crimes for prosecution based solely on the remaining factors.
37. David C. James, The Prosecutor's Discretionary Screening and Charging Authority,
PROSECUTOR, Mar-Apr. 1995, at 26 (discussing different charging models in use by
prosecutors).
38. Id at 22.
39. A prosecutor can also affect, both formally and informally, the investigation pro-
cess that precedes the filing of a charge. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HAiv. L. REv. 1521, 1536-37 (1981).
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C. The Limited Nature of Judicial Review of Prosecutorial
Decisionmaking
Prosecutorial decisions about whom to charge are virtually im-
mune from judicial review on constitutional grounds. ° The Supreme
Court's decisions "uniformly have recognized that courts normally
must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute."'4 '
While a prosecutor must have "probable cause to believe that the ac-
cused committed an offense defined by statute, '42 the de minimis na-
ture of the probable cause standard provides little real restraint on
prosecutorial decisionmaking. There is only one vehicle for making
the criminal prosecutor account for her charging decisions before a
judge-a motion for dismissal based on a claim of selective
prosecution
4 3
To prevail on a selective prosecution claim, the Supreme Court
requires that a defendant show that the charging decision was "delib-
erately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification."'  This element of deliberateness re-
quires showing not just a discriminatory effect but also a discrimina-
tory purpose.4 s Showing a mere pattern of prosecutions against any
particular group, for example, is insufficient: "'Discriminatory pur-
pose,' however, implies more than.., intent as awareness of conse-
quences. It implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 4 6 In essen-
tially requiring that the defendant prove that the prosecutor charged
her "because of" an illegal reason, the Court has established a burden
40. See id. at 1537-43.
41. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
42. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
43. Selective prosecution motions are, by their nature, brought by defendants in cases
that have been charged. There is no procedural vehicle by which a victim can challenge a
prosecutor's decision not to charge a case. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87
(1981) (stating that the decision to prosecute is solely within prosecutor's discretion);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (stating that a private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another); Dix v. Superior Court, 807
P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1991) (finding that a crime victim lacked standing to litigate sentencing
issue as matter of public interest).
44. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (emphasis added).
45. See United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Georgia's capital punishment
statute based on a statistical study showing its disproportionate impact on African-
Americans).
46. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation omitted), quoted in
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610.
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of proof that is very difficult to sustain.47 Given the multiplicity of
factors going into the charging decision, prosecutors can almost al-
ways point to some other reason for charging a case. Proving that a
single factor served as a "cause" of the decision to prosecute would
require a virtual admission of discriminatory intent on the part of the
prosecutorial agency.48
The complexity of the charging decision and the intangibility of
the factors involved are the Court's primary justifications for its reluc-
tance to second-guess prosecutorial charging decisions:
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial.
review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecu-
tion's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's over-
all enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.49
In particular, the Court has emphasized the need for the prosecutor to
"decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice
system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge."50
The Court has also expressed concern that "subjecting the prose-
cutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry" may "chill law
enforcement."' 51 Implicit in this concern may be a recognition of the
political ramifications of charging decisions. Choices among different
47. See BENNET GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCr 4-15 to 4-21; 4-32 (1995);
Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1542 n.78.
48. In United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), the Supreme Court held that
in order to be entitled to discovery of federal prosecutorial policies, selective prosecution
claimants must first demonstrate that "federal prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."' Id. at 1487 (quoting Wayte,
470 U.S. at 608). Demonstrating a discriminatory effect required in turn that the claimant
"show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." Id. How
a claimant could ever demonstrate that two potential defendants were similarly situated in
light of the multitude of factors prosecutors may consider in making charging decisions the
Court did not say.
49. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("Judicial deference
to the decisions of these [federal prosecutors] rests in part on an assessment of the relative
competence of prosecutors and courts.").
50. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 396. Prosecutorial discretion does not end once the complaint
is filed. Perhaps the most important post-charging exercise of discretion is in the area of
plea bargaining. During the plea bargaining process, prosecutors inevitably balance the
importance of one case to the public interest against the importance of other cases as a
consequence of the limits of their own resources. A generous disposition offered on one
case often reflects the need to focus time and resources on other, more important cases.
Consequently, prosecutors have complete discretion about what positions to take in plea
negotiations. See Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1536-37.
51. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607, quoted in Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
Spring 1997] PRIVATE FINANCING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 679
victims and among potential defendants can directly affect the inter-
ests of various political groups. Each time the prosecutor comes
before the bench to explain charging policies, she simultaneously
speaks in a political forum to these different groups.
Perhaps it is this political dimension of "outside inquiry" into
prosecutorial motives that the Court finds troubling. The burden of
proof in the political forum, unlike in the legal forum, is on the prose-
cutor, and in that context the discretionary nature of her decisionmak-
ing process puts her at a disadvantage. Absent a more objective
decisionmaking process, it would be difficult for a prosecutor to prove
that a policy that had the effect of singling out certain defendants or
ignoring certain victims was not intended to be discriminatory.5 2
D. Freedom from Conflict of Interest as the Predicate for
Prosecutorial Discretion
The prosecutor's freedom of action is supposedly justified by a
parallel freedom from influence. The prosecutor is trusted to balance
competing private interests in society because she is not dependent
upon any discrete private or governmental interest.5 3
Prosecutorial independence is safeguarded in a number of differ-
ent ways. First, prosecutors are to different degrees politically ac-
countable to the electorate.54 The chief prosecutor in any office is in
most cases either an elected official (as is the case in many counties
and municipalities) or appointed by an elected official (as is the case
with all United States Attorneys, who are appointed by the Presi-
52. In Armstrong, the Supreme Court dusted off the "presumption of regularity" that
applies to the decisions of federal prosecutors. See 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("'[I]n the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties."') (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1926)). The Court in Armstrong justified this presumption in terms of the broad discre-
tion afforded prosecutors. See id.
53. One commentator has argued that this independence mirrors the structure of the
administrative state as a whole in the United States. See William E. Nelson, Moral Ethics,
Adversary Justice, and Political Theory: Three Foundations for the Law of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 926 (1989) (characterizing the administrative
state as fragmented into a series of independent power centers "to insure that neither the
bureaucracy as a whole nor any independent unit of it becomes subservient to any single
social interest"); see also MnuAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE Au-
THoRrrY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986) (contrasting the hierar-
chical model of continental European bureaucracies against the "coordinate" model of the
United States, where authority is pushed downward and outward in order to fragment
government power).
54. See People ex rel Younger v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 156, 170-71 (Ct. App.
1978) (stating that the district attorney may be entrusted with significant discretionary
powers because he is answerable to the electorate).
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dent). If that prosecutor subordinates the public interest to some nar-
rower interest, an electoral mechanism for a political response exists.55
A second safeguard of prosecutorial independence inheres in the
separation of powers among the branches of government. In this
sense, the prosecutor is independent from the judiciary and the legis-
lature, and she traditionally enjoys a measure of independence within
the executive branch as well. 56
Another important safeguard of prosecutorial independence is
the body of ethical and legal rules that define a conflict of interest as
any condition under which the prosecutor might be influenced by
some discrete interest to an intolerable degree.57 These rules protect
55. To be sure, this electoral mechanism imperfectly protects the public interest. Some
commentators have criticized the prosecutor's broad immunity from judicial review on the
grounds that it renders political checks on her discretion meaningless. See, e.g., Vorenberg,
supra note 39, at 1559 ("The fact that prosecutors or their appointing authorities must seek
election is small comfort in view of the low visibility with which they exercise their discre-
tion."). Also, money, in the form of campaign contributions, can influence elected prose-
cutors. See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angeles, 609 P.2d
1029 (Cal. 1980) (finding that campaign contributions can create conflicts of interest, but
do not necessarily disqualify an official from acting on matters pertaining to the contribu-
tion). In this context, private financing is not the only avenue of influence over
prosecutorial decisionmaking for those with money to spend.
56. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discussing separation of
powers doctrine in the context of a challenge to authority of independent counsel ap-
pointed under the Ethics and Government Act of 1978).
One commentator has argued that society's interest in the evenhanded treatment of
all by the government "should be an explicit factor in the analysis of structural issues and
should provide an animating principle for the jurisprudence of separated powers." Re-
becca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. Rav. 1513, 1516
(1991).
57. See, eg., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (personal interest in litiga-
tion disqualified federal prosecutor); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (prosecutor cannot have a pecuniary interest in case prosecuted); Ganger v.
Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967) (prosecutor of domestic violence case cannot repre-
sent wife/victim in divorce proceeding for a contingent fee); People ex reL Clancy v. Supe-
rior Court, 705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985) (private attorney cannot represent the state as
prosecutor on a contingency fee basis); Davenport v. State, 278 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. Ct. App.
1981) (prosecutor who represented victim of domestic violence in divorce against defend-
ant cannot prosecute the criminal case for battery); Commonwealth v. Tabor, 384 N.E.2d
190 (Mass. 1978) (prosecutor cannot try murder case after representing victim's widow in
civil case for damages); People v. Basham, 170 N.W.2d 238 (S.D. 1969) (prosecutor cannot
represent victim/family in civil action even if not pending simultaneously). But see Dick v.
Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's subsequent representation of victim in
civil case did not mandate disqualification); Brooks v. State, 228 So. 2d 24 (Ala. Ct. App.
1969) (no conflict of interest even though prosecutor represented victim in civil case); Peo-
ple v. Jimenez, 528 P.2d 913 (Colo. 1974) (defendant waived any conflict that might result
from district attorney prosecuting vehicular homicide and representing victim in civil ac-
tion); Allen v. State, 257 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (no conflict in civil representation of
crime victim by prosecutor). For a discussion of prosecutorial conflicts of interest, see
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the equality interests implicated by the prosecutor's discretionary
decisionmaking process by preserving the independence upon which
that discretion is predicated.5 8 In Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton
et Fils S.A.,5 9 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the role of con-
flict-of-interest rules in protecting the equality interests that judicial
review cannot reach in individual cases.60 Vuitton involved a criminal
contempt action for violation of a civil injunction prohibiting the
counterfeiting of the plaintiff's product.6 The district court appointed
the plaintiff's attorneys as special counsel to prosecute the contempt
against the infringing parties. 62 The Supreme Court held that "coun-
sel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be ap-
pointed to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of
that order. ' 63 The Court essentially employed a due process analysis,
Susan Brenner & James Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 415 (1993); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administra-
tion of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, 79 GEo. LJ. 1 (1990); Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and
Conflicts of Interest" A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1992). For a bibliogra-
phy of ethical codes and federal statutes applicable to prosecutorial conflicts of interest,
see Bessler, supra note 3, at 546 n.140.
58. A prosecutor's immunity from civil suit also protects the prosecutor's indepen-
dence. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,424 (1976) ("The public trust of the prosecu-
tor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages.").
59. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). For commentary on Vuitton, see Joan Meier, The "Right" to a
Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contemp" Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 85 (1992); Terri L. Braswell, Comment, Criminal Procedure-Young v.
United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A.: The Right to a Disinterested Prosecutor in a Fed-
eral Criminal Contempt Proceeding Arising from the Underlying Civil Litigation., 18 MEM.
ST. U. L. REv. 143 (1987).
60. See 481 U.S. at 812-13.
61. See id. at 789-90.
62. See id at 791.
63. Id. at 790. While a majority agreed that private attorneys should not prosecute
contempt in such circumstances, it split over whether to reverse the conviction per se or
whether to remand the case for a harmless-error review. That portion of Justice Brennan's
opinion that concluded that the error was fundamental and required per se reversal, id. at
809-14, was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, dissented from Justice Brennan's funda-
mental error analysis and from the judgment as well, arguing that the case should be re-
manded to determine whether the appointment of the private prosecutor was harmless
error. See id at 825-27. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia provided a fifth
vote for per se reversal on the ground that the appointment of a contempt prosecutor by a
federal court violates the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive
branch. See id at 815.
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although it based its holding on the Court's supervisory powers over
the prosecution of judicial contempt actions.64
The distinction in Vuitton between liberty and equality interests is
somewhat inchoate because the Court shifted back and forth between
different conceptions of prosecutorial impartiality. The Court began
its analysis by discussing the prosecutor's general obligation to justice
and truth as follows:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obli-
gation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest therefore, in a criminal prosecu-
tion is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
nor innocence suffer.65
In pointing out that a private lawyer prosecuting a charge of criminal
contempt acts in essence as a public prosecutor, however, the Court
expressed the obligation of impartiality in terms of disinterestedness
with respect to any particular private party:
Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal con-
tempt action represent the United States, not the party that is
the beneficiary of the court order allegedly violated .... The
prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in
vindication of the court's authority. A private attorney ap-
pointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore certainly
should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes
such a prosecution. 66
This concept of disinterest clearly involved a concern that the prosecu-
tor might further the interests of a private person over the public in-
terest. The Court warned that
64. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion arguing that appointing an interested
party's counsel as prosecutor for a criminal contempt violated the due process requirement
of "a disinterested prosecutor with the unique responsibility to serve the public, rather
than a private client, and to seek justice that is unfettered." Id.
Holdings based on the Court's supervisory authority have sometimes been subse-
quently extended to the states through due process jurisprudence. See, eg., Bloom v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (recognizing a due process right to a jury trial for nonpetty
contempts); Cheff v. Schackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (recognizing under supervisory
authority the right to jury trial for nonpetty contempts). One commentator has argued
that Vuitton should be extended to ban all private prosecutions on due process grounds.
See Bessler, supra note 3, at 571-602. Another commentator has argued that Vuitton
should not be extended to state courts through due process because private enforcement is
a key value in the contempt context. See generally Meier, supra note 59.
65. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added), quoted in Vuit-
ton, 481 U.S. at 803.
66. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added).
Spring 1997] PRIVATE FINANCING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 683
[a] prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported
prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards
for the private client. Conversely a prosecutor may be tempted
to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing
benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommenda-
tion against criminal charges.67
The Court then noted that the appointment of private counsel illus-
trated "the potential for private interest to influence the discharge of
public duty."'68
Thus far, the Court in Vuitton seems to be primarily concerned
with the prosecutor's need to be disinterested in the sense of not hav-
ing a bias that would favor any private interest. In acknowledging the
difference between the standards applicable to a judge and a prosecu-
tor, however, the Court mixed the concept of disinterestedness with
that of zealousness: "The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is
consistent with our recognition that prosecutors may not necessarily
be held to as stringent a standard of disinterest as judges. ' 69 The
Court then noted with approval its statement in an earlier case that
"[i]n an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to
be zealous in their enforcement of the law." 70
By introducing zealousness into its analysis, the Court blurred
two different conceptions of prosecutorial impartiality. Up to this
point the Court had been concerned with the threat to impartiality
posed by a prosecutor who favors the private interest of some person
or group.71 Such a prosecutor is "interested" in the sense that she
favors private interests over the public interest. This concern makes
sense in the context of the case that was before the Court, in which an
attorney representing a private party was concurrently acting as public
prosecutor. Zealousness, however, concerns the threat to impartiality
posed by the prosecutor's own interests in the outcome of the case.
This concept of zealousness is illustrated by Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,72
67. Id. at 805.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 807.
70. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980), quoted in Vuitton, 481 U.S. at
807.
71. The Vuitton Court's reference to the plaintiff's interest in suppressing the counter-
feiting of their goods as a private interest leaves unmentioned the public's interest' in the
enforcement of anti-counterfeiting laws. At the root of the Vuitton Court's concern, per-
haps, is a recognition that such private interests are not completely congruent with the
public interest and on some occasions can be in conflict with it. See infra notes 141-45 and
accompanying text.
72. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
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the case cited by the Vuitton court to distinguish the obligations of
judge and prosecutor.
In Jerrico, the Court rejected a due process claim alleging that a
government agency performing prosecutorial functions would be
tempted to over-prosecute a statute in order to increase its share of
the monetary penalties collected.73 Such over-prosecution would not
have singled out any particular persons or groups, and the Jerrico
Court explicitly noted that, had that been the case, its decision might
have been different.7 4
In Vuitton, however, the Court seemed to ignore the distinctions
between the kinds of interests operating to influence the prosecutor
and instead based its decision on the degree of influence:
Ordinarily we can only speculate whether other interests are
likely to influence an enforcement officer, and it is this specula-
tion that is informed by appreciation of the prosecutor's role. In
a case where a prosecutor represents an interested party, how-
ever, the ethics of the legal profession require that an interest
other than the Government's be taken into account. Given this
inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to speculate whether
the prosecutor will be subject to extraneous influence.75
The private interest present in Vuitton violated the lower standard of
disinterestedness applicable to prosecutors because "the ethics of the
legal profession require[d]" that this interest be taken into account.76
73. See id at 251-52.
74. See iL at 250 n.12.
75. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 807.
76. Resolving the issue of private financing of government criminal prosecutions
through the application of existing ethical rules would be problematic at best. Accepting
money from a victim or any other third party raises ethical issues that require an informed
waiver by the client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY EC 2-21 (1982)
("A lawyer should not accept compensation or any thing of value incident to his employ-
ment or services from one other than his client without the knowledge and consent of his
client after full disclosure."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNmucr Rule 1.8(f)
(1995) ("A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other
than the client unless: (1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference
with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relation-
ship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected .... "); i d at
Rule 5.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional
judgment in rendering such legal services."). Since the client is the State itself, however,
the issue of obtaining a waiver is obviously problematic. Even when obtained from clients
in ordinary criminal cases, such waivers are increasingly disfavored. See, eg., ANNOTATED
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(f) commentary at 149 (2d ed. 1992)
("With regard to criminal cases involving third-party payment of legal fees, courts increas-
ingly recognize that the court's interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice
system can outweigh client consent to payments by third parties.").
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In a revealing footnote, however, the Court did distinguish be-
tween overzealousness and partiality towards some private interests:
It is true that prosecutors may on occasion be overzealous
and become overly committed to obtaining a conviction. That
problem, however is personal, not structural. . . . [S]uch
overzealousness "does not have its roots in a conflict of interest.
When it manifests itself the courts deal with it on a case-by-case
basis as an aberration. This is quite different from approving a
practice which would permit the appointment of prosecutors
whose undivided loyalty is pledged to a party interested only in
a conviction."7 7
This discussion implies that these different threats to the impartiality
of the prosecutor must be regulated in different ways. The threat to
due process posed by the overzealous prosecutor overly committed to
conviction is addressed by judicial review on a case-by-case basis.
However, the threat to due process posed by the prosecutor commit-
ted to the interest of some private party is a "structural problem," and
presumably cannot be handled as it arises in each case.78
The suggestion that a prosecutor partial to a private interest con-
stitutes a structural problem is also evident in the Court's justification
for not applying harmless-error analysis to conflict-of-interest cases.
One of the reasons advanced by the Court for requiring per se rever-
sal in such cases was that "[a] prosecution contains a myriad of occa-
sions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to shape the
record in a case, but few of which are part of the record. '7 9 Earlier in
its analysis the Court had described some of these "invisible" deci-
sions as follows:
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such
as the determination of which persons should be targets of in-
vestigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what
information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be
charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as
witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on
which they will be established, and whether any individuals
should be granted immunity. These decisions, critical to the con-
duct of a prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the
court.8o
77. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 808 n.18 (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l,
Inc., 760 F.2d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 1985)).
78. Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) ("[S]tructural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism... defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards.").
79. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 813.
80. lML at 807 (emphasis added).
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A prosecutor partial to a private interest presents a "structural prob-
lem" in the sense that the structure of judicial review does not permit
detection of signs of such influence, a limitation that precludes any
attempt to determine whether the error permitting the conflict was
indeed "harmless."
In defending its decision not to apply harmless-error analysis, the
Vuitton Court made analogies to cases where the judge or jury was
subject to influence: "We have always been sensitive to the possibility
that important actors in the criminal justice system may be influenced
by factors that threaten to compromise the performance of their
duty."81 The Court then referred to past decisions refusing to apply
harmless-error analysis to racial discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury and to the exposure of a petit jury to publicity unfavorable
to the defendant.82 Implicit in this comparison is the suggestion that,
because prosecutors, like juries, make decisions that are subject to
limited review, great care must be taken to filter out influences that
might taint their decisions.83
Ironically, it is the sweeping nature of prosecutorial discretion
that makes it impossible for a court to tell if a prosecutor is acting
under the influence of private interests. This led the Vuitton Court to
81. L at 810.
82. See id
83. Analogous issues were raised-though ultimately resolved differently-in Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). In Rumery, the Court considered the validity of
release-dismissal agreements where a criminal defendant releases her right to file a civil
rights action in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending criminal charges. See icL at
394. The Court refused to hold all such agreements invalid per se on due process grounds
and upheld the agreement before it because the release had been voluntarily executed and
was not adverse to the public interest. See id. In a concurring opinion that provided the
crucial fifth vote, Justice O'Connor described the potential conflict between public and
private interests in such cases as follows:
[T]he availability of the release option may tempt officials to ignore their public
duty by dropping meritorious criminal prosecutions in order to avoid the risk,
expense, and publicity of a § 1983 suit. The public has an interest in seeing its
laws faithfully executed. But, officials may give more weight to the private inter-
est in seeing a civil claim settled than to the public interest in seeing the guilty
convicted.
IdL at 400 (citation omitted); see also Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993)
(invalidating a release agreement on the grounds that the prosecutor made no attempt to
show that the public interest was advanced by the release); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494
(8th Cir. 1993) (upholding a release-dismissal agreement on the grounds that docket con-
trol, the costs of prosecution, and concern that dropping charges without a release would
be misconstrued as an admission of police misconduct were legitimate interests for a prose-
cutor to consider). See generally James A. Trowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor: Restric-
tions on Threatening Prosecution for Civil Ends, 37 ME. L. REv. 41 (1985) (arguing that
ethical rules should be amended to forbid prosecutors from bargaining for waivers of civil
liability against government entities or private persons).
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impose a blanket rule to eliminate the possibility of such influence in
cases of criminal contempt.' 4 The Court implicitly recognized that,
because the equality interests at play in prosecutorial decisionmaking
cannot be protected by judicial review in individual cases, they must
be protected across-the-board by preserving that aspect of the sys-
tem's structure that justifies the prosecutor's wide discretion in the
first place-the independence of the prosecutor. While influences
that make the prosecutor merely overzealous find some regulation in
judicial scrutiny of a prosecutor's actions against any particular de-
fendant, the invisible damage done to equality interests by improperly
selective prosecutions must be pre-empted by prophylactic rules that
shield the prosecutor from influence by private interests.8 5
HI. Funding Sources as an Institutional Influence upon
Government Discretion
Private financing raises the question of whether public officials
such as prosecutors can be influenced by a flow of private money to
the institutions in which they operate. The Supreme Court has not
had to confront a case where a voluntary flow of private money into
institutional coffers allegedly threatened prosecutorial discretion. The
Supreme Court has, however, recognized the existence of comparable
"institutional biases" in three of its past decisions.8 6 Those cases dealt
with the impact upon judicial or prosecutorial officials of certain
schemes for the distribution of fines or administrative penalties. Each
case involved a claim that officials were fining as many people as pos-
sible in order to maximize revenues for their institutions.87
84. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 807-09.
85. Cf. Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("'[T]he practical
impossibility of establishing that the conflict [of interest] has worked to defendant's disad-
vantage dictates the adoption of standards under which a reasonable potential for preju-
dice will suffice."') (quoting People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980)).
86. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); cf. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188
(1982) (denying due process challenge to use of private insurance carriers to administer
Medicare claims where claims paid from federal funds); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973) (holding that administrative board of optometrists cannot hear charges filed against
competitors).
87. A number of lower courts have also recognized due process violations flowing
from an institutional interest in maximizing revenues or minimizing costs to government.
See United Church of the Med. Ctr. v. Medical Ctr. Comm'n, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982)
(state statute allowed Medical Center Commission to decide which lands revert by eminent
domain to the Commission; provisions of Medical Center Act gave the Commission finan-
cial stake in outcome of proceedings); Augustus v. Roermer, 771 F. Supp. 1458 (E.D. La.
1991) (state statute requiring 2% bail fee payable to county coffers to support criminal
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An ad hoc quality haunts the Supreme Court's attempts to wres-
tle with this sort of fiscal institutional bias. In each case the Court
attempted to weigh the potential influence by looking at the amount
of money involved. In two of the three cases, the Court actually calcu-
lated the amount of fines collected and compared that number to the
institution's total operating budget.88 That calculation seemed to
serve as the basis for guessing whether the amount of the fines was
sufficient to influence the officials involved.
Three questions can be extracted from these three opinions that
are relevant to assessing a private financing scheme's potential influ-
ence over prosecutors. First, to what degree could the prosecutor in-
fluence the amount of money received? Second, what measure of
dependency upon the money is likely to develop? Third, will the re-
sulting influence contribute to prosecutions against particular persons
or groups? Applying these three questions to the various forms that
private financing has already taken yields useful insights about both
the nature of private financing's potential influence and how that in-
fluence might be doctrinally framed.
A. The Fiscal Institutional Bias Cases
In Tumey v. Ohio,8 9 the Supreme Court recognized for the first
time that government officials and their institutions can be influenced
by the possibility of increased flows of money. The Ohio statutes chal-
lenged in Tumey provided that criminal violations of the Prohibition
Act would be tried before the town mayor, and the local municipality
would receive all fines collected for the violations. 90 In holding that
these statutes violated due process, the Court found that the revenues
resulting from these fines created an "official motive to convict and to
graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village." 91
judicial system); Meyer v. Niles Township, 477 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (town supervi-
sors decided who qualified for payment from township's fund for medical injuries); Gore v.
Emerson, 557 S.W.2d 880 (Ark. 1977) (town received majority of revenues from fines im-
posed by mayor in his judicial capacity); People v. Barboza, 627 P.2d 188 (Cal. 1981) (pub-
lic defender's office could maximize budget by not declaring conflicts of interest in cases).
But see Baran v. Port of Beaumont Navigation Dist., 57 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 1995) (statute
granting ports the power to veto pilotage rates did not violate due process); People v.
McDonnell, 434 N.E.2d 71 (ll. Ct. App. 1982) (rewarding police officers who made ten
arrests for driving while under the influence by giving them a day off with pay did not
violate due process rights of defendants arrested).
88. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 245; Ward, 409 U.S. at 58.
89. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
90. See id. at 516-17.
91. Id. at 535. Under this statutory scheme, the mayor had both personal and institu-
tional interests in the result of the trial: the mayor would receive his costs in addition to his
Spring 1997] PRIVATE FINANCING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 689
The Court noted that the state legislature had intentionally cre-
ated this incentive, having drafted the statute "to stimulate small mu-
nicipalities... to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused
of violations of the Prohibition Act."92 The specific inducement of-
fered to these small municipalities was the money they would receive
after "dividing between the state and the village the large fines pro-
vided by the law for its violations. ' 93 Toward this end, the statute
"offer[ed] to the village council and its officers a means of substan-
tially adding to the income of the village to relieve it from further
taxation." 94 The Court believed that the legislature's incentive plan
was working-the mayor had stated that he would only convene the
court if the village needed finances and that "substantial sums" from
the fines were used for "village improvements and repairs." 95
In finding that adjudication by the mayor violated due process in
these circumstances, the Court repeatedly emphasized the mayor's
role in the political structure of the village and his responsibility for
fiscal matters. For example:
The mayor is the chief executive of the village.... He is charged
with the business of looking after the finances of the village....
[T]he law is calculated to awaken the interest of all those in the
village charged with the responsibility of raising the public
money and expending it, in the pecuniarily successful conduct of
such a court. The mayor represents the village and cannot es-
cape his representative capacity.... With his interest, as mayor,
in the financial condition of the village, and his responsibility
therefor, might not a defendant with reason say that he feared
he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence from one who
would have so strong a motive to help his village by conviction
and a heavy fine?96
regular salary only for a case in which a conviction was obtained. See id. at 519. The Court
found that these costs constituted a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the out-
come of the case, but held that the institutional interest constituted a separate due process
violation: "[T]he pecuniary interest of the Mayor in the result of his judgment is not the
only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here." Id. at
532.
Where officials have a personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of a decision made,
the conflict of interest analysis is more straightforward. See, eg., Connally v. Georgia, 429
U.S. 245 (1977) (finding both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments violated where
judges received fees for granting search warrant requests). Private financing involves not a
personal but an institutional interest in the monies received.
92. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
93. Id. at 532-33.
94. Id. at 533.
95. Id. at 521.
96. 1d at 533. In Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928), the Court denied a due process
challenge to a similar fine scheme where the mayor had no executive responsibilities and
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At the heart of the due process violation found in Tumey, then, was a
recognition that public officials can be influenced by the prospect of
an increased flow of money into their institutions.
Ward v. Village of Monroeville97 also involved a "mayor's court."
In Ward, the Supreme Court actually attempted to quantify the possi-
ble influence by calculating the money involved. Noting that a major
part of the village's income came from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and
fees imposed by the village mayor in his judicial capacity, the Court
compared the dollar amount of fines collected each year to the vil-
lage's total revenues for those years.98 The Court also pointed out
that the mayor repeatedly ordered the chief of police to charge sus-
pects under village ordinances rather than state statutes whenever
possible in order to ensure that monies collected would be paid to the
village and not to the county.99
Invoking Tumey, the majority in Ward held that this statutory
scheme did not provide the neutral and detached judge required by
due process.100 The dissent disagreed as to whether the mayor-judges
were likely to be influenced by the amounts involved.' 0' The dissent
argued that the facts did not justify the assumption "that every mayor-
judge in every case will disregard his oath and administer justice con-
trary to constitutional commands or that this will happen often
enough to warrant the prophylactic, per se rule" adopted by the ma-
jority.10 2 Accordingly, the dissent argued that the due process issues
involved should be considered on a case-by-case basis. 3
The ad hoc nature of this disagreement revealed itself in the brev-
ity of the two opinions-together they added up to only about five
exercised only judicial functions even though the mayor's salary was affected by the
number of convictions.
97. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The Ohio statute at issue authorized mayors to sit as judges in
cases involving traffic offenses and violations of local ordinances. See id. The Court
framed the issue as whether trial before an official who was also responsible for revenue
production and law enforcement denied the due process guarantee of a disinterested and
impartial judicial officer. See idU at 59. The statute did not provide for any direct personal
benefit to the mayor from a conviction.
98. See i&t at 58. For each year, the fines amounted to one third to one half of total
village revenues. See id.
99. See id. at 59 n.1. The Court also noted that when legislation threatened the loss of
these funds, "the village retained a management consultant for advice." Id. at 58.
100. See iL at 61-62.
101. See id at 62 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that the holding in
Tumey should be limited to cases where the official had a direct pecuniary stake in the
outcome of the case. See id.
102. Id.
103. See ia.
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pages. The Justices found themselves on terrain where it was difficult
to make principled distinctions. Either the money was enough to
sway someone or not, and there was simply not much more to say.
In only one case has the Supreme Court considered whether fines
could bias a prosecutorial agency in its exercise of discretion. Mar-
shall v. Jerrico, Inc.10 4 involved a statutory scheme under which mon-
ies collected as civil penalties for child labor violations were funnelled
to the responsible agency of the Department of Labor as reimburse-
ment for the costs of enforcement. In concluding that there was no
"realistic possibility that the assistant regional administrator's judg-
ment will be distorted by the prospect of institutional gain as a result
of zealous enforcement efforts,"'10 5 the Supreme Court once again
found itself counting dollars and analyzing budgets. The penalties col-
lected amounted to less than 1% of the agency's budget, and the
agency had not spent its full budget appropriations during the relevant
years.' 6 The unspent funds that were returned to the treasury each
year also substantially exceeded the amount of the penalties col-
lected.'0 7 Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the penalties
collected had not "resulted in any increase in the funds available to
the [agency] over the amount appropriated by Congress.' 0°
In Jerrico, however, the Court added a gloss to its interpretation
of the numbers: "Unlike in Ward and Tumey, it is plain that the en-
forcing agent is in no sense financially dependent on the maintenance
of a high level of penalties."' 0 9 In characterizing Ward and Tumey as
concerning fiscal dependency upon fines, the Jerrico Court gave con-
text to its comparison of the amount of fines collected to the institu-
tion's total budget. The Court apparently reasoned that the greater
the share of total revenues accounted for by fines, the more the
money would be missed if the amounts assessed decreased. An offi-
cial who was counting on those revenues would presumably be influ-
enced by the prospect of their loss.
The Jerrico Court also examined the degree to which the adminis-
trator-prosecutor could influence the level of revenues received. In
104. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). Analogies continue to be made between the discretion af-
forded the criminal prosecutor and the discretion afforded the agency administrator prose-
cuting civil actions. See, eg., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see also Ruth
Colker, Administrative Prosecutorial Indiscretion, 63 TuL. L. REv. 877 (1989); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653 (1985).
105. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 250.
106. See id,
107. See id. at 250-51.
108. Id. at 246.
109. Id, at 251 (emphasis added).
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Tumey and Ward the mayor-judges sat as both judge and jury and
could directly influence the amount of revenues received through
their verdicts and sentences. In Jerrico, in contrast, the national office
of the labor agency-not the regional officers making the
prosecutorial decisions-allocated the penalties collected.110 Further-
more, the penalties had "never been allotted to the regional offices on
the basis of the total amount of penalties collected by particular of-
fices." ' Ultimately, the Court found the potential for bias too
contingent.112
Finally, the Jerrico Court distinguished between prosecutorial and
judicial officials in a way that left open the question of what standards
would apply to an alleged influence that threatened to make a prose-
cutor not overzealous but selective.11 3 Referring explicitly to the wide
discretion traditionally accorded criminal prosecutors, the Court rea-
soned that the prosecutorial nature of the Labor Administrator's func-
tion merited a more relaxed standard than that applicable to officials
acting in a judicial capacity.' 14 Conceding that the Due Process
Clause does impose some limits on "the partisanship of administrative
prosecutors," the Court acknowledged that "[a] scheme injecting a
personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process
may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial
decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional ques-
tions."" 5 In the Jerrico footnote discussed earlier,1 6 the Court distin-
guished sharply between overzealousness and partiality to
110. See id. at 246.
111. Id. The Court also noted that in the one year in which the penalties were allocated
to regional offices and not retained by the national office, the zealous assessment of fines
was rewarded only indirectly in the sense that the funds were allocated on the basis of
expenses incurred, not penalties collected. See id. at 251.
112. See id. The Court reasoned that only under the following facts would an adminis-
trator be tempted to over-prosecute under the statute in order to obtain a higher allocation
of penalties: the national office would have to decide to allocate the penalties to the re-
gional offices; the sums allocated would have to exceed the amount returned; the regional
administrators would have to receive authorization to expend additional funds to increase
enforcement; the increased effort would have to result in increased penalties; and the ad-
ministrative law judge and any reviewing courts would have to go along with the penalties.
See icL at 252.
113. See id at 248-50.
114. See id. at 250. The Court declined to apply Tumey or Ward on the grounds that the
functions of the administrator "resemble those of a prosecutor more closely than those of a
judge." Id. at 243. While the administrator-prosecutor was authorized to assess a civil
penalty of up to $1,000, an assessed party was entitled to a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge. See id. at 244-45.
115. Id- at 249-50.
116. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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prosecutions against particular persons: "In particular, we need not
say whether different considerations might be held to apply if the al-
leged biasing influence contributed to prosecutions against particular
persons, rather than to a general zealousness in the enforcement
process." 117
Thus, despite the "remoteness" and insignificance of the alleged
influence in Jerrico, the Court reserved the question of whether an
influence that made the prosecutor improperly selective rather than
merely overzealous might lead to a different result. In leaving open
the question of the improperly selective prosecutor, the Jerrico Court
implicitly distinguished between the equality and liberty interests im-
plicated by prosecutorial decisionmaking. The Vuitton Court quoted
this passage when it observed that influences that might make prose-
cutors improperly selective should subject them to the same standards
of disinterestedness as judges.""
B. Assessing the Institutional Bias of Private Financing
The voluntary nature of private financing creates a potential for
influence different from the fine schemes considered by the Supreme
Court in Tumey, Ward, and Jerrico. A prosecutor is not tempted to
favor the interests of a defendant sentenced to pay a fine because fine
payments are involuntary.119 However, a private party making volun-
tary contributions toward criminal prosecutions might expect some-
thing in return. Therein lies a potential for influence not yet
considered by the Supreme Court: A privately financed prosecutor
might be tempted to favor her donors in order to justify past contribu-
tions or to attract future contributions. 20
117. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 250 n.12.
118. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 n.22
(1976).
119. The same distinction can be made with respect to the traditional means of financ-
ing criminal prosecutions by the government-taxes. Prosecutors are not tempted to favor
victims by virtue of how much tax they pay because taxes are also paid involuntarily. A
taxpayer who does not like a prosecutor's decisions still has to pay her taxes.
120. The public finance literature analyzing the impact of user fees upon government
bureaucracies describes exactly this type of influence. For example:
[A] user-charge program may improve operating efficiency because agency staff
must respond to client demand. Agencies usually operate with funds obtained
from and justified to a legislative body. That justification will elaborate needs as
estimated by the agency staff and will be defended according to performance cri-
teria established by the agency staff. User-charge finance, however, requires a
shift to preferences articulated directly by customers. The agency must provide
services that are desired by consumers, or it will fail the financial test for survival.
It cannot define what clients should want in its budget defense; it must provide
the services clients actually will purchase.
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Such favoritism was envisioned by the trial judge in People v. Eu-
banks,21 the Silicon Valley case described earlier.12 The judge ques-
tioned the prosecutor for allowing the victim corporation to pay over
$13,000 for independent expert investigation costs:
Doesn't that put the District Attorney in a position, as a human
being, to feel a greater obligation for this particular victim than
some other fellow or person who doesn't offer to pay existing
debts? ... [L]et's assume that the District Attorney's office, in
the review of their case ultimately conclude that, 'Well, you
know, maybe our case isn't as strong as we thought at the incep-
tion.' Would it be easier for them to tell a victim who paid no
money to the D.A.'s office, 'You don't have a case,' than it
would be for one that you received $15,000 from?12 3
The judge's questions suggest that a privately financed case that might
otherwise have been dismissed on its merits could be pressed to trial
out of a sense of obligation to the contributing victim and that a pri-
vately financed victim might receive greater consideration than a
"nonpaying customer."' 24
Since private financing involves an influence that could poten-
tially affect prosecutions against particular persons-those targeted by
the contributor-rather than a general overzealousness in the enforce-
ment process, Jerrico, Ward, and Tumey yield no insight about what
degree of potential influence, if any, the Supreme Court might tolerate
in this context. However, the Jerrico Court's concern with fiscal de-
pendency and the prosecutor's influence over the amount of money
received do provide two interesting lines of inquiry.
The potential for a prosecutor to become dependent upon private
financing depends to some degree upon how the private money is put
MKESELL, supra note 15, at 425; see also B. GUY PETERS, THm PoLrrrcs OF BUREAU-
cRAcy 131-32, 155, 262 (1989) (describing the influence of pressure groups over bureaucra-
cies through budgetary politics). To some degree, those who would argue that private
financing would make criminal prosecution more efficient assume that prosecutors would
be so influenced.
121. 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996).
122. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
123. Brief for Respondents, People v. Eubanks, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting Record at 4561, 4563). The California Supreme Court agreed: "No reason is ap-
parent why a public prosecutor's impartiality could not be impaired by institutional inter-
ests, as by personal ones." People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 319-20 (Cal. 1996).
124. See MODEL CODE OF PROFF-SSioNA REsPONsmIri-Y EC 5-22 (1982) ("Economic,
political, or social pressures by third persons are less likely to impinge upon the independ-
ent judgment of a lawyer in a matter in which he is compensated directly by his client and
his professional work is exclusively with his client. On the other hand, if a lawyer is com-
pensated from a source other than his client, he may feel a sense of responsibility to some-
one other than his client.").
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to use. Eubanks, for example, involved payment of some of the inves-
tigation costs,12 an expense constituting a variable cost in the sense
that it arises only if the investigation is continued. Other schemes for
private financing involve payment of salaries, an expense that is fixed
in the sense that the salaries must be paid regardless of whether any
particular case is prosecuted. In California's Ventura County, for ex-
ample, proceeds from the workers' compensation fraud prosecution
fund established by local business contributions were to be used to
pay the salary of the assistant district attorney responsible for prose-
cuting those cases.126
An institution that depends on voluntary contributions to pay the
salary of any of its personnel is dependent upon those contributions in
an important way, given that most bureaucracies struggle to avoid
having to eliminate positions. The potential for influence on the indi-
vidual level is even stronger. For example, a prosecutor whose salary
is paid out of business contributions to a fund for a certain category of
white collar crime might fear that her salary would not be forthcoming
for the next fiscal year if her prosecutorial decisions did not satisfy her
contributors. 127
Even private financing only of variable costs-such as the expert
investigator costs in Eubanks-could engender such a dependency. A
prosecutor assigned to complex fraud cases who relied on voluntary
contributions from insurance companies to pay for special investiga-
tive costs necessary for the successful prosecution of those cases might
feel vulnerable to pressure from those contributors. Fiscal depen-
dency, moreover, is not the only type of dependency that might moti-
vate the decisions of prosecutors. Prosecutors who accept private
financing of variable costs in white collar cases might feel that their
credibility in the relevant business community depends on their ability
125. See 927 P.2d at 312-14. What particularly concerned the California Supreme Court
was that most of the private funds were used to reimburse the district attorney for expenses
that had already been incurred. See id at 321.
126. See McDonald, supra note 7, at B1.
127. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-23 (1982) ("A person or or-
ganization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others possesses a potential power to
exert strong pressures against the independent judgment of those lawyers. Some employ-
ers may be interested in furthering their own economic, political, or social goals without
regard to the professional responsibility of the lawyer to his individual client .... [Ain
employer may seek, consciously or unconsciously, to further its own economic interests
through the action of the lawyers employed by it.").
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to justify the investments made by obtaining the results desired by
their contributors.1'8
Assessing the prosecutor's ability to influence the level of contri-
butions to be received is complicated. Like the administrator-prose-
cutor in Jerrico, and unlike the mayor-judges in Tumey and Ward, the
prosecutor cannot directly set the amount of money to be received via
the typical private financing scheme. The ability of prosecutors to
maintain or increase the amount of private financing that is forthcom-
ing depends in part upon the degree to which they can serve the inter-
ests of contributors. For instance, in the private financing in Eubanks,
the donor contributed only to the prosecution of the case in which the
donor was the victim.129 Given the high level of interest the donor-
victim had in his own case, the prosecutor could directly serve the
donor's interests by an aggressive and successful prosecution of that
particular case.'30 Serving such a contributor successfully might in-
crease the chances that future contributions from other similarly situ-
ated victims would be forthcoming.
In the Ventura County example, however, business interests con-
tribute to a fund to be used to prosecute an entire category of crime.
Because the funds of various contributors are commingled together,
the relationship of the donors individually, or even as a group, to any
particular case is less direct. On the other hand, the possibility that a
prosecutor might come to depend upon the continued flow of those
funds is arguably much greater since they finance an entire category of
criminal behavior on an ongoing basis. 3 '
128. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-21 (1982) ("The obli-
gation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on behalf of his client requires
that he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free judgment. The desires of a
third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer unless that person is in a position to
exert strong economic, political, or social pressures upon the lawyer. These influences are
often subtle, and a lawyer must be alert to their existence.") (footnote omitted).
129. See generally 927 P.2d 310.
130. The California Supreme Court recognized the potential for improper influence in
such a situation: "[A] prosecutor may have a conflict if institutional arrangements link the
prosecutor too closely to a private party, for example a victim, who in turn has a personal
interest in the defendant's prosecution and conviction." Id. at 320.
131. A practice closely related to voluntary private financing by business interests is the
use of dedicated taxes or assessments to finance certain types of business-related prosecu-
tions. In Pennsylvania, insurance companies are assessed fees based on their volume of
business in the state, and the proceeds are placed in a fund that is disbursed to prosecutors
for use in insurance fraud prosecutions. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701-303(c) (1996).
Given the mandatory nature of the "contributions" to the fund, prosecutors are not subject
to the same degree of pressure to satisfy the insurance companies funding their activities.
While representatives of the insurance companies have seats on the commission that deter-
mines how the funds are distributed among prosecutorial agencies, see 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
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Ironically, the example of private financing that arguably involves
the lowest potential for influence is also the least typical. In the Susan
Smith case, 32 the individuals who mailed in contributions to fund the
capital prosecution of Smith presumably had no direct interest in the
outcome of the case beyond a general desire for justice or vengeance.
There was also little prospect of the prosecutor receiving future con-
tributions given the unusual circumstances that led to nationwide in-
terest in the case in the first place. Even so, the South Carolina
Attorney General's opinion authorizing the county to accept the con-
tributions stipulated that the county prosecutor needed to state clearly
that by accepting the money he was not agreeing to exercise his
prosecutorial discretion in any particular way.' 33 Further, contribu-
tions made expressly on the condition that the death penalty be
sought had to be returned.M
To the degree that a scheme for private financing of government
prosecutions creates a flow of money that can influence the prosecu-
tor to favor the contributor's interests and upon which the prosecutor
might grow dependent, private financing itself creates the type of fis-
cal institutional influence that the Supreme Court foresaw in Tumey,
Ward, and Jerrico. Because that influence threatens to make the pros-
ecutor partial to discrete private interests and not merely overzealous
in the prosecution of all crime, the fiscal institutional bias cases pro-
vide no guidance as to whether the mere possibility of such influence
should trigger the across-the-board prohibition applied in Vuitton, or
whether some potential bias should be tolerated. Ultimately, that
question turns upon the importance attached to the equality interests
threatened by the private financing of government prosecutors.3 5
§ 3701-301(B) (1996), the amount of money available to be disbursed is a function solely of
the volume of insurance business transacted in the state.
132. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
133. See Letter from Charles Molony Condon, Att'y Gen. of South Carolina, to Robert
E. Guess, Union County Attorney, S.C. (Jan. 25, 1995), available in 1995 WL 67626.
134. See id. The Union County prosecutor did unsuccessfully seek the death penalty
against Smith, but all of the contributions had already been returned. The blessing of the
South Carolina Attorney General notwithstanding, some county officials were reportedly
repulsed by the donors' calls for Smith's execution. See Donations to Aid Smith Prosecu-
tion to Be Returned, Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.), Feb. 1, 1995, at 6A ("We can't guarantee
anybody's death.").
135. An interesting analogy can be drawn between the incentives created by private
financing of criminal prosecutions and the incentives created when a law enforcement
agency receives funds from civil forfeitures in criminal cases. In both cases, a mechanism
exists by which officials can increase the revenues at their institution's disposal. This as-
pect of civil forfeiture in criminal cases has drawn much criticism. See, e.g., Michael F.
Alessio, From Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act, 48 SMU L. REv. 429 (1995); David P. Atkins & Adele V. Patterson,
698 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:665
IV. Efficiency, Legitimacy, and the Tension Between Public
and Private Interests
Private financing focuses attention on an unappreciated aspect of
the status quo-the degree to which financing government prosecu-
tions through taxes reserves control over the prosecutor's vast powers
to the government. Financing government prosecutions through vol-
untary private contributions inevitably surrenders a measure of that
control to the contributors in a way that may affect how the benefits
and the punishments of the criminal justice system are distributed.
Attempts to justify this surrender on the grounds of economic effi-
ciency136 and victims' rights 37 are foreseeable, but private financing
serves those interests selectively, at best, and at the expense of
equality.
Society's interest in the equal treatment of all victims and all de-
fendants has always been submerged beneath the independence of the
government prosecutor. In undermining that independence, private
financing clarifies what society has at stake in the equality of the pros-
ecutor's choices. Exploring these equality interests systematically is
beyond the scope of this Article, but this Part argues that equality in
areas of discretionary decisionmaking is ultimately a question of legiti-
macy and of control over government power.
Punishment or Compensation? New Constitutional Restrictions on Civil Forfeiture, 11 U.
BRmDGEPORT L. REv. 371 (1991); Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick and
Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 1 (1994); Terrence G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civib Constitutional
Limitations on Civil Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 255 (1994). For an economic analy-
sis of such forfeiture schemes, see Catherine Cerna, Note, Economic Theory Applied to
Civil Forfeiture: Efficiency and Deterrence Through Reallocation of External Costs, 46 HAS-
TiNas L.J. 1939 (1995).
The incentives for misconduct created by civil forfeiture could be eliminated if the
proceeds from the forfeiture were not retained by the law enforcement agencies involved.
While raising revenue by seizing ill-gotten gains is a worthy goal, it does not necessarily
follow that law enforcement must keep the proceeds. "Civil forfeiture ... operates as a
tax, in that revenue arises from application of the system of laws. Police agencies have no
more special right to these proceeds than does the IRS have a special claim to its ... tax
collections." MIKESELL, supra note 15, at 427. Unlike civil forfeiture, however, private
financing involves voluntary contributions that would probably not be forthcoming unless
applied to prosecutions in which the contributors had an interest.
136. See, e.g., PETER SELF, GovENm,,Mrcr By THE MARKET? (1993) (defining public
choice theories of politics as arguing that government should be remodeled and trans-
formed according to market concepts of competition and efficiency).
137. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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A. The Unstated Assumptions of Efficiency
By coaxing additional dollars from the private sector, private fi-
nancing increases the resources available for prosecuting crime with-
out any increase in public spending. Private financing thus seems
efficient in the sense that society can prosecute more crime with the
same investment of public dollars. 38 Private financing of criminal
prosecutions will not, however, increase the total capacity of the crim-
inal justice system; it will merely change the mix of cases prosecuted.
Privately financing one part of a publicly financed criminal justice
system would inevitably divert an additional share of public resources
toward the privately financed cases. Providing private dollars for
prosecutors in insurance fraud cases, for example, while not providing
private money for more courtrooms, judges, and public defenders for
those cases would mean that, ultimately, more public dollars would
have to be spent on insurance fraud cases than would otherwise have
been spent in order to keep pace with the increase in prosecutions.
Given the general lack of excess capacity in the criminal justice sys-
tem, a "systemic inflation" of sorts would result from a greater
number of cases chasing a fixed number of courtrooms. Ultimately,
the only way to avoid this effect would be for the contributor to fi-
nance all costs of the criminal justice system. This, however, is an un-
likely prospect.' 39
Diversion of public resources would be even greater if only varia-
ble prosecution costs (such as expert witness fees) were financed.
Given the limited number of prosecutors available, privately financed
and publicly financed cases would compete for their time and atten-
tion. Since such fixed costs of the prosecutor's office would continue
to be publicly financed, private financing of only the prosecution's va-
riable costs would lead to an even greater public investment in the
privately financed cases. They would be more likely to be prosecuted
because of the greater resources available for them."'
138. For a comprehensive economic analysis of "user fees" by government in other con-
texts, see Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REv. 795 (1987).
139. To the extent that privately financed cases would be brought against the indigent,
more is at stake than merely increasing the congestion of the criminal justice system. If
private funds are available for providing expert witnesses for the prosecution in certain
types of cases but not for the defense, for example, either the public will have to spend
more on indigent criminal defense or the relative quality of indigent criminal defense will
be compromised.
140. This unseen diversion of public dollars is a common problem with user fees or
charges for government services in general. Sometimes fiscal problems are exacerbated as
a result: "During periods of tight finances decision makers are tempted to expand reve-
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Given the lack of excess capacity in both prosecutors' offices and
the criminal justice system in general, a privately financed case would
inevitably involve an opportunity cost for society. Each privately fi-
nanced criminal case would displace a publicly financed prosecution
to some extent. To be sure, it is possible that the displaced case might
not have served the public interest as well as the privately financed
case. On the other hand, the fact that some group in society is willing
to privately finance a case does not necessarily mean its prosecution
would advance society's interest more than would prosecution of the
displaced publicly financed case. The existence of an individual or
group willing to finance the prosecution of a crime or category of
crimes simply means that such a group believes prosecution of that
crime is in its interest. The absence of willing financiers might reflect
that the costs of a privately "unfinanced" crime are diffused through-
out society and not concentrated in any one individual or group with
money to spend.14'
A prosecutorial choice is truly "efficient" to the degree that it
yields the greatest social good for the least investment of resources.
Private financing is only "efficient" if one assumes that the financing
would flow toward those problems affecting society most profoundly.
Presumably, private financing will always be efficient from the con-
tributors' point of view because their interests will be served by the
diversion of public resources toward prosecutorial attention to the
crimes that concern them most.' 42
nue-generating activities, often reasoning that any revenue will help with the fiscal prob-
lem. Unfortunately, such expansion can actually increase the total subsidy required for
that service and worsen the overall budget condition." MIMESELL, supra note 15, at 424.
141. For this reason, private financing is unlikely to serve as a panacea for the problem
of white-collar crime. "Many white-collar crimes tend to be diffuse in their victimization-
affecting a large number of victims with injuries ranging from trivial to great." Kip Schle-
gel & David Weisburd, White-Collar Crime: The Parallax View, in WHIrrE COLLAR CRIME
RECONSIDERED, supra note 32, at 3, 11. An environmental crime, for example, could po-
tentially affect an entire community, but the perceived interest of any one individual in
prosecuting the offender would probably be too slight to elicit a contribution.
Private financing would probably also not be forthcoming where an "identifiable vic-
tim" does not exist, as would be the case in many environmental crimes.
[T]he temporal feature of many white-collar crimes both masks and complicates
the victimization. It masks the victimization because the injuries often occur
much later than the actual act. It complicates victimizations because the crimes
are often not singular or isolated acts, but part of a sequential chain of events
leading to detectable injury.
Ia- at 11-12.
142. Discriminating between activities that bring in some form of revenue and those
that do not is a common phenomenon:
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B. Public Good, Private Good, and the Interests of the Victim
In an important sense, society's interest is served anytime a viola-
tion of its criminal laws is prosecuted. Arguably, all criminal prosecu-
tions serve society by deterring others from violating the law. Thus,
law enforcement has been described as a "public good" in that society
benefits from having it and suffers from its absence. 143 Fire protection
is an example of a public good. When a house fire is extinguished, the
greater community benefits because the fire might have spread. Simi-
larly, the benefits resulting from enforcement of criminal laws is un-
derstood to extend beyond the parties affected by any particular
crime. A violator jailed through a privately financed prosecution
would be unable to commit further crime against others. Crime that
goes unpunished may also spread, like fire.
Thinking of criminal prosecution solely as a public good, how-
ever, fails to recognize the substantial benefit that a successful prose-
cution can confer on private parties. Sometimes, this benefit dwarfs
society's more general interest in the prosecution of crime. People v.
Eubanks'" illustrates this contention. The victim corporation there
was also the plaintiff in a parallel civil suit against the same defend-
ants.145 Victory in the criminal case would greatly assist victory in the
civil case.' 46
The ability to charge for particular services can distort agency decision making.
Thus, a high school football team receives magnanimous resources because gate
receipts are sizable, whereas the girls' volleyball team gets hand-me-downs. The
question for resource allocation is contribution to the purposes of the community
or social benefits); simple cash flow should not be the determining factor in such
an instance.
MnEsELL, supra note 15, at 425.
143. See iL at 2-5; see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) ("'[T]he
purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a forum for the ascertainment of private
rights. Rather it is to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law
while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant."') (quoting
United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3rd Cir. 1979)); STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JusncE Standard 3-2.1 cmt. (1979) ("The idea that the criminal law, unlike other
branches of the law such as contracts and property, is designed to vindicate public rather
than private interests is now firmly established.").
144. 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996).
145. See id. at 324.
146. Even if a conviction were not obtained, the victim would still enjoy substantial
benefits: the defendant's legal strategy would probably have been revealed in the criminal
case, the victim corporation would undoubtedly benefit from some "free discovery," and
the defendant's resources for legal defense would be somewhat diminished. See generally
Gabriel L. Gonzalez et al., Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 30 AM. CRiM. L. REv.
1179 (1993).
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Such a benefit could be seen as coming within the victim's legiti-
mate interest in restitution for the crime committed against him.
147
While the victim's restitutionary interest in a criminal case certainly
does not conflict with society's interest in prosecuting a case, neither
are the two interests congruent. A victim can benefit more from a
prosecution than society in general, just as the resident whose kitchen
fire is extinguished by the fire department before it consumes his en-
tire house benefits more than someone who lives on the opposite side
of town.148
Many of the benefits flowing to a victim from a criminal prosecu-
tion may still obtain even if the accused is not guilty of the crime. In
such situations the interests of society and those of the victim diverge.
The defendant corporation in Eubanks, for example, was a competitor
of the victim corporation, and facing criminal prosecution for intellec-
tual property theft probably compromised the defendant's ability to
compete against the victim to some extent.1 49 Distracting the com-
pany's top management, chilling the company's relations with custom-
ers and suppliers, pushing down the price of the company's stock-all
of these problems are arguably more serious for a company that is
indicted by the government for criminal violations than for a company
merely sued by a competitor in a civil action. °50 The "victim" corpora-
147. Some scholars have developed theories of crime that give the victim's interest in
restitution a central role. See; e.g., RANDY E. BARN=r, ASSESSING TE CRIMINAL: REMST-
TuTION, RETRIBUTION, AND T=E LEGAL PROCESS 349, 363 (1977); Randy E. Barnett, The
Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. Jups. 117 (1980).
148. The existence of a victim who is willing and able to pursue a civil remedy has been
used as a justification for nonprosecution by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
Antitrust for the Reagan Administration:
When private parties suffer substantial injury, their incentives to seek redress are
high, particularly in light of the availability of treble damages and attorneys' fees.
In such cases there is little reason for the government to prosecute and spend
resources that could otherwise be used against more systematic violations for
which no private plaintiff is likely to sue or for which criminal sanctions are
desirable.
William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 661, 691 (1982).
149. Chief Judge George expressed this concern in his concurring opinion. See Eu-
banks, 927 P.2d at 323-25.
150. Of course, it would be unethical for either a private lawyer or a public prosecutor
to press a criminal case to obtain a civil advantage. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-105(A) (1982) ("A lawyer shall not present, participate in present-
ing, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil mat-
ter."); see also AMERICAN BAR FoUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsmILrrY 343 (1979) ("The criminal process, which is designed to protect society as
a whole, is undermined when it is used to force settlement of private claims or controver-
sies . .. ").
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tion enjoys the benefits flowing from the accusation against its com-
petitor regardless of whether its competitor is guilty. To the degree
that the mere filing of a criminal accusation by the government against
an innocent party is enough to confer substantial benefits on a victim,
the victim's interests in seeing the prosecution pressed can directly
conflict with society's interest in prosecuting only the guilty.151
Financing entire categories of crime through funds established by
the businesses affected involves similar disparities between the public
and private interests. While all of society benefits from the prosecu-
tion of workers' compensation fraud-especially when the costs of
this crime are shifted to consumers through higher prices-the compa-
nies directly affected by the fraud arguably benefit more."' A com-
pany that does not have to pay a fraudulent claim enjoys a direct
benefit, and other companies similarly situated receive a deterrence
benefit that is greater than society's more general interest in the deter-
rence of crime. Successful prosecution of workers' compensation
fraud deters such fraud against local businesses more than it deters
crime generally.
A potential conflict between society's interest and the victim's in-
terest also exists in this context. The people have an interest in seeing
only fraudulent workers' compensation claims deterred, but to the ex-
tent that legitimate claims are also chilled because of a perceived ali-
ance between business and the district attorney's office, the
contributing businesses derive an additional benefit from not having
to pay these claims. 53
To the degree that an individual or group in society benefits dis-
proportionately from the prosecution of certain crimes, and to the de-
gree that those individuals or groups have money to spare, those
crimes may be likely candidates for private financing. The willingness
of monied interests to finance certain prosecutions does not necessar-
ily mean that those crimes are in society's interest to prosecute. That
determination requires a comparison of the social benefit of the pri-
151. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that the public interest is harmed if an innocent person is convicted).
152. Even if a company shifted 100% of the cost of such crimes to consumers through
pricing, the company would still suffer because the increase in price would decrease reve-
nues unless the demand for the company's services did not decrease.
153. Other types of potential conflict between victims' and society's interests in the
prosecution of a crime exist. For example, a victim might want to accept an offer of restitu-
tion in exchange for dismissal of the charge, whereas society's interest might be better
served by prosecution of the offender. This scenario is not uncommon in many white collar
crimes. See, eg., Paul Jesilow et al., Reporting Consumer and Major Fraud, in WHrrE CoL-
LAR CimE RECONSIDERED, supra note 32, at 149, 166-67.
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vately financed prosection to the social benefit that would have re-
sulted from the publicly financed cases that would have been
prosecuted but were not. This, again, is a measure of the cost to soci-
ety of lost opportunity, something to which the existence of a willing
group of private financiers does not speak. 154
C. Legitimacy as the Substance of Equality in Matters of Discretion
Ultimately, society's best answer to the question of what
prosecutorial choices will result in the greatest good for the greatest
number is a process, a process that is considered legitimate in part
because it denies everyone equally a direct influence over the prose-
cutor's decisions. 55 In the absence of any objective and widely ac-
cepted standard for determining whether prosecuting insurance fraud
or environmental crime best serves society's interest, for example, the
legitimacy of that process serves as the very substance of equality.
This relationship between the inherently discretionary nature of
the prosecutor's decisionmaking and the need for legitimacy was cap-
tured by the Supreme Court in its analogy in Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 156 between prosecutors and juries. 57 Decision-
making by prosecutors and juries is to some degree a "black box" pro-
cess. Just as outsiders are not permitted to observe the deliberations
of the jury, scrutiny of the prosecutor's deliberative processes is dis-
couraged. In both cases, the scope of review of the decisions made is
strictly circumscribed. Finally, both juries and prosecutors make deci-
sions that are inherently discretionary in the sense that they are not
reducible to any sort of formula or meaningful standard.'5 8 Given the
absence of any standard for judging the validity of the decision
reached, the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process is all that
remains.
154. Peter Self has argued that public choice arguments ultimately deny the meaning of
the concepts of "public good" and "public interest." See SELF, supra note 136, at 232-36.
He accuses public choice advocates of wanting to fragment the concept of a public interest
by "establishing more direct linkages between personal interests and public policy." Id at
236. He argues for a return to a more positive concept of active citizenship based on a
wider range of social values in place of the "consumer democracy" that public choice of-
fers. Id
155. For a procedural model of equal protection analysis that describes legitimacy pri-
marily in terms of equal representation of all interests in governmental decisionmaking,
see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisIusr (1980).
156. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
157. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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As in all questions of legitimacy, much depends upon appear-
ances.' 9 To the degree that prosecutors who take private money will
be seen as beholden to the contributors, the legitimacy of the
prosecutorial decisionmaking process suffers, as will the legitimacy of
the entire criminal justice process, given the central role played by
prosecutorial discretion.
The legitimacy of the prosecutor's decisionmaking process has
been recognized as inextricably linked to the polity's willingness to
accept the authority of government. 16° A criminal prosecution by the
government both confers legitimacy upon a private complaint and de-
pends upon legitimacy for its acceptance. The authority of govern-
ment prosecutions may be diminished if they are perceived as being
exercised disproportionately on behalf of the wealthy.161
D. Preferential Access to Justice as a Threat to Equality
Determining to what degree prosecution of a crime advances the
public interest has traditionally been entrusted to the prosecutor's sole
discretion. To the degree that private financing enables the prosecu-
tor to select from a broader menu of cases to prosecute by adding to
the resources at her command, it offers a benefit. To the degree that
private financing compromises the prosecutor's ability to place the
public interest above the interests of her contributors, it exacts a cost.
The prosecutor's own interest in maximizing the resources subject to
159. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 ("[A]n interested prosecutor creates an appearance of
impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general.").
160. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 (warning that misuse of special powers of the prosecu-
tor "'impair[s] public willingness to accept the legitimate use of those powers') (quoting
WOLFRAM, supra note 20, § 8.102 at 460).
161. Under Madisonian constitutionalism, the legitimacy of government depends on
limiting the influence of such factions. Madison defined "faction" as any group "united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Faction has been
interpreted by some scholars in terms of divisions in wealth. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 14-15,
153-54 (1941) (citing unequal distribution of property as primary concern); DAVID A.J.
RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERmCAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 39 (1989) (defining faction
as encompassing religious, economic and political divisions).
For Madisonians, the capture of government power by private interests destroys the
legitimacy of government power. "Factionalized ends.., were illegitimate ends. They
could not be justified in terms of the deeper value of equality that is fundamental to consti-
tutional government, namely that political power must be reasonably justifiable to all per-
sons as respecting their rights and serving the common interests of all." RICHARDS, supra,
at 258. Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection is seen
as an articulation of "the underlying moral ideal of the equality of all persons" upon which
the Constitution is based. Id.
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her control could conflict with society's interest in the equal consider-
ation of each case. This equality interest concerns the fair or optimal
allocation of the prosecutor's resources.
Even if one assumes that private financing would add to the
number of crimes prosecuted without detracting from the opportuni-
ties of nonpaying victims to secure redress, or if one assumed that the
prosecutor would only accept the financing when it was in the public
interest and not merely in her institutional interest to do so, private
financing would still threaten a distinct equality interest that is not
related to the fair allocation of scarce resources: Privately financed
victims will enjoy preferential access to justice. Even if private financ-
ing does not diminish the access to justice for others, the privately
financed victim would still enjoy superior access to justice by virtue of
her wealth. A two-tier system of criminal justice would develop in
which privately financed cases would enjoy the best experts and serv-
ices while publicly financed cases would be left to compete for their
share of limited public funds. A rich victim might get a better prose-
cution than a poor victim. This threat to equality makes no assump-
tions about influence or trade-offs between cases.162
162. This prospect clearly concerned the California Supreme Court in Eubanks: "A sys-
tem in which affluent victims, including prosperous corporations, were assured of prompt
attention from the district attorney's office, while crimes against the poor went unprose-
cuted, would neither deserve nor receive the confidence of the public." 927 P.2d at 318
(footnote omitted). The dangers of a two-tier system of criminal prosecution are a subset
of a larger problem involving the privatization of services traditionally provided by the
government. In the words of Robert Reich, "the fortunate fifth is quietly seceding from
the rest of the nation." EVAN McKENziE, PRJVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER AssoCrATIONS AND
TE RisE oF RESIDENTIAL PRrvATE GovERNmENT 175 (1994) (quoting Secretary of Labor
Robert Reich). As more and more government services are "privatized," some fear that
monied interests in society will seek to withdraw from public institutions: "I am trying to
envision what happens when 10 or 20 per cent of the population has enough income to
bypass the social institutions it doesn't like in ways that only the top fraction of 1 per cent
used to be able to do." Id. at 175 (quoting Charles Murray).
A danger exists that those who can privately finance "pet prosecutions" may grow less
willing to pay taxes to support public prosecutions generally. Evan McKenzie described
exactly this phenomenon in the context of common-interest-housing developments
("CIIDs"):
Advocates of CIDS have long contended that the assessments residents pay to
their associations are the equivalent of property taxes .... They contend that if
they are paying for their own trash removal, for maintenance of their own streets,
and for upkeep on their own park, they should not have to pay property tax as-
sessments for such services.... The solution, from their perspective, would be to
permit CID residents to deduct some or all of their assessments from their prop-
erty tax bill. In areas with large numbers of CIDS, this could amount to a serious
loss of local government revenues.
Id. at 165. In the CID context, what began as a voluntary effort by private associations to
provide additional services for themselves has resulted in pressures to withdraw their tax
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Preferential access to justice for monied interests also threatens
the defendant's distinct interest in equality. To the degree that the
quality of the prosecution a defendant faced might depend on the
wealth of the person accusing her, a different sort of inequality ob-
tains. Arguably, no defendant has a right to a fiscally strapped prose-
cutor, but the prospect of defendants facing disproportionate
prosecution by the government based on the wealth of their accusers
is troubling.163 The powers wielded by government are considerable,
as is the cost of merely being accused by the government of criminal
conduct. To the degree that the wealthy would enjoy a superior ability
to unleash these forces on those who offend their interests, inequali-
ties in political power that already exist as a function of wealth would
be exacerbated. 1'
Ultimately, private financing forces a choice between competing
goods. To the extent that private financing might allow prosecution of
certain crimes that are foregone solely because of cost, society's inter-
ests in punishing the guilty are advanced. To the extent that these
additional prosecutions are the product of preferential access to jus-
tice for monied interests, society's interests in the equal treatment of
all victims and of all defendants suffer. Private financing inevitably
pits these two interests against one another.
dollars from public institutions responsible for those same services. Conceivably, private
financing of criminal prosecutions could result in pressure for a similar withdrawal.
163. Cf. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 ("If a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial pow-
ers to gather information for private purposes, the prosecution function has been seriously
abused even if, in the process, sufficient evidence is obtained to convict a defendant.").
164. For a thoughtful polemic arguing that the disproportionate influence of monied
interests over government is society's most serious problem, see RicHARD N. GOODWiN,
PRoMIsES TO KEEP 13 (1992) ("To a significant extent, private power has subordinated the
structures of representative democracy to the service of its own interests.... Our welfare
... has been damaged by a profane combination of private interests with public authority
•••.7w).

